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I welcome this opportunity to speak to you, continuing a tradition 
foIlowed by several of my predecessors. I look forward to it as an oppor-
tunity to exchange impressions - for you to leam about the US perspective 
from me, but also for me to leam more from you about the Portuguese 
perspective on some very important issues. 
The key concept that I hope you wil! carry away from this discussion 
is this: 
The US commitment to NATO and to the security of Europe remains 
unshakable. 
I stress this beca use in recent weeks I have read and heard various 
commentaries raising the question whether this longstanding tenet Df Ame-
rican foreign policy stil! holds. Of course it is elear that the security stuc-
tures in Europe need to be updated because of the end of the Cold War 
and because of the demonstrated inadequacy of the current security struc-
ture to respond to the new chaIlenges we face today. But the recent commen-
taries address, not the need for updating, but more fundamental questions 
of the US purpose and co=itment. European confidence has been shaken 
by differences with the US over Bosnia, and by questions about the impact 
of the Republican victory in the US Midterm EIections. 
The basic fact is that Europe and America need each other. American 
security and prosperity depend on a stabIe and prosperous Europe; an 
unstable Europe would be disastrous for my country economicaIly and, 
as ampIy proved in two WorId Wars, would be costly in other ways as 
weIl. Europe, in turn, continues to need an American anchor for its secu-
rity structures. 
177 
NAÇAO E DEFESA 
«Bul», you may say, «Wha/ aboul lhe American rela/ionshi" lVi/h 
Asia. or its interest in expanding frade in Latin America?» 
The United States is a global power with in!erests in many parts of 
the world. Asia and Latin America presen! enormous opportunities for 
Iradc and investment, and not only fo)' Americans. We also have major 
security interests in both Asia and Latin America. 
But let me repeat oncc more for c\arity. 
America's securil)' and pros!,e/'il)' depend Olt a slabla and pl'ospe/'ou, 
Europe. 
Naturally therc will be differences bctween allies, ali the more so 
now that Europe has b.en frced from the overshadowing fear of Soviet 
aggression. Wc are a11 AlIiance of democracies, and we have ovcrcome 
disagreements in the past. And as Secretary Christophet· has said, <<lilc 
crisis ilt Bo,nia is ab01l1 Bosnia and lhe fonner Yugoslavia. Jt does nOI 
diminish NATO's ir/'eplaceable /'ole as the key lO European Securit)'. Tlze/'c 
is· 110 disagl'ec11lcI1t among us on this point», The common interests are 
too fundamental. the habits and struclmes of coopcration too ingraincd, to 
be overthrown so easily. 
«But», you may say, «Tlze Al'l'lbassador represents lhe Clinton Admütis~ 
Iration. The Republicans w/to have tl1ken aVe/' Capital Hill mil)' have 
different ideas.» 
T cannol pretcnd thal nOlhing has changed in Washington. There has, 
in fact, been a significanl shift of powcr. But it is also easy to exaggerale 
the effecls. 
[n many areas of foreign policy. the changes will bc small for two 
central reasons: One is Ihal lhe Constitulion gives the President a speeial 
measure of control over foreign policy, and two is that on lhe funda-
mental issues there is a shared perceplion 01' the national intel'est that 
crosses party \ines. 
The changes will be grcatest in those areas where lhe Constitution 
gives the Congress lhe mos! power: Those involving money. US foreign 
aid is in for a very rough ride. US contributions for UN peacekeeping and 
other multilateral activities are olheI' areas that will be closely examined 
by a skeptical Congresso 
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But I would e.ution you to question some of the more alarmist predic-
tions coming out of Washington. It is wise to recall three truths about US 
politics and foreign policy: 
- Radical-sounding candidates usually tone down their uemands once 
they have real decisionmaking power; 
- Committee Chairmen have some power to ueiay anu obstruct, bul 
they also understand that to effeet real change they need to build 
consensus; 
- The Republican Party, like lhe Democratic Party, is a coalition 
containing many different viewpoints. 
In many areas therc will be much less change, either because less 
money is invol ved ar because there is a basic consensus on fundamental 
American interests. I would arguo that European security is one of the 
latter. There will be a 101 of posturing, argumenls about whelher NATO 
should do more in this ar Ihat crisis, whelher it should cxpand sooner 
ralheI' than Iater, and yes, about burdensharing. Bul nane 01' this allers 
the basic facI thal Europc ond America necd each olheI'. 
Let me recaJ] for you some of our ideas about how to procecd from 
here in arder to prateeI EUl'ope's stability and pl'osperity. We are opera-
ting on twa major assumptions: 
- First, thal democratic forms of governmenl and frce mal'kel econo-
mies are cssential to guaranteeing pence and prosperity; 
- Second, that the collapse of Cold War slructures has lefl impor-
tanl pam of the continent feeling lhe ncetl for institutional anchors. 
We havc a multi-prongcd strategy for filling this void. The three main 
elements of that slrategy are: 
- First, we believe thal exisling struclUl'eS of proven value, such as 
NATO and lhe EU, should gradually exlend Iheir coverage Eastward; 
- Second, we believe lha I the CSCE (now OSCE) should be furlher 
strenglhened to prevent and manage problems oUlside the purview 
af NATO and the EU; 
179 
NAÇÃO E DEFESA 
- Finally, we believe we must work closely with Russia, in NATO 
and the OSCE as well as in other fora, both to reassure it and to 
include it in efforts to assure European security. 
Important progress toward these goals has been registered in the 
Iast few months. Within NATO there is a growing consensus that the 
Alliance's central purposes include not just maintaining the transatlantic 
link and guaranteeing the security of allied states, but also underpinning 
the security of key countries to the East of the AlIiance's existing borders 
and drawing Russia constructively into Europe. 
In December NATO agreed to examine, within the Ailiance, the «How» 
and «Why» of expansion, including an examination of how the Partnership 
for Peace can conll'ibute to the processo 
The Alliance is not discussing the «Who» or «Whem) in lhe course 
of this study. We aim for a process that is gradual, delibera te, and transpa-
rent, and that treals each applicant nation individuaUy and on its own 
merits. 
The goal, again, is enhanced slability. This is not an attempt to draw 
a new line of division in Europe. Neither, however, should we aUow the 
oId division of the Continent to be perpetuated, explieitly 01' implieitly, by 
aUowing any counlry outside NA TO to have a veto over another's future 
membership in the Alliance. 
The NATO Ministerial reaffirmed the importance of the Pal'tnership 
for Peace, which provides a forum for NATO cooperation with aU our 
formeI' adversaries in the old Soviet Empire. The United States will con-
tribute 30 million doUars over the next year to strengthen the Joint Exer-
eise Program of the Partnership for Peace, and President Clinton has 
proposed a contribution of 100 million doUars for 1996 to further the 
goals of the Partnership. The Partnership will help interested partners 
prepare for future Alliance memhership, promote inleroperability, increase 
transparency, and develop habits of cooperation. The PFP is both the best 
path to membership in the Alliance for those who choose to pursue it 
and for others their primary link to a core Western institution. Thus, 
the recent NAC deeision only increases the importance of lhe Partnership. 
The US will be working energeticaUy in 1995 with the sleps agreed 
aI the Dccember NAC. This includes particularly the NAC deeision to 
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begin an internai Alliance study on expansion. We must handle this process 
in a way that builds confidence between NATO and ali our PFP partners. 
To achieve success, we need steadines, unity of purpose, and openness. 
Like other members of the Alliance, the US places a high priority 
on building a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia. We 
want this relationship to become a significant feature of post-Cold War 
European security arrangements. As you know Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
in Brussels December 1, and President Yeltsin in Budapest December 5, 
expressed concern that NATO enlargement could presage a new division 
of Europe_ A week later, Vice President Gore explored the issues with 
President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders. He explained what the De-
cember Communique says and does not say. He found that the Russians 
had significantly misunderstood what the Alliance intends to do in 1995 
with respect to enlargement. The Vice President c1arified those points, as 
I have don with you. While the Russian leaders were reassured, they 
still harbor concerns that NA TO enlargement will have negative implica-
tions for Russian security. This week in Geneva, Secretary Christopher 
met with Foreign Minister Kozyrev to explore issues including how NATO 
and Russia can most productively relate to one another in the post-Cold 
War world. Achieving understanding is likely to be a long-term process 
about which we will consult fully with your Govemment and our other 
allies. 
The bottom !ine on NATO enlargement is to bring to Central Europe 
the kind of stability and security which has come to characte1'Íze the Wesl. 
This will benefit everyone, members and non-members of the Alliance alike. 
Expansion is not aimed against anyone. It is intended to reinforce the 
positive trend toward integration in Europe, as well as curb any trends 
toward poli ti cal disintegration and instability. 
The Budapest Summit also made important progress in strengthening 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, now renamed 
lhe Ol'ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE_ The 
measures agreed to will complement NATO's efforts to build cooperative, 
integrated seeul'Íty structures for Europe. OSCE will have a more clear1y 
defined mission and increased abilities and resources, especially in the 
areas of conflict prevention and crisis managemen!. This stronger OSCE 
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gives ali states in thc Euro-Atlantic Community a forum in which they can 
expeet their seeurity eoneerns to be seriously addressed. 
The goal is to ereale a tool whieh ean be used, as President Clinton 
said, «To preveni fulure Bosnias». Of eourse, the OSCE is not, nor is il 
inlended to be, a substitute for NATO. 
One example of the OSCE's expanding role is the Summit's agreement 
to provide OSCE Peaeekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, onee we have in 
plaee a political agreement and an appropriate UN Resolution. 
Let me say a few words aI this point about the Westem European 
Ullion, the WEU. We were delighted at the appointment 01' a distinguished 
stalesman like Ambassador Cutileiro as Seeretary General of the WEU, 
alld we also look forward to very close cooperalioll with Portugal in its 
WEU Presidellcy eapacity during the next six Months. The United States 
continues to believe that the WEU ean make an important and positive 
contributíon to the emerging European Seeurity Arehitecturc. 
We intend to work cIosely with aH WEU members to ensure that 
the WEU's emerging role is compatíble with and complementary to that 
01' NATO, which we continue to regard as the essential basis for European 
stability and securily. I have already met with both Ambassador Cutileiro 
and AmbassHdor Ouintela Paixão, the Direetor General for multilateral 
"flairs in lhe Foreign Ministry, regarding the WEU Presideney. We will 
continue to stay in dose oontact. 
The world has undergone historie changes over the last few years. 
furopean stability and seeurity is no longer just a question of deterring 
or, more recent1y, of integrating counlries Iying to the Easl. As European 
Union leaders reeognized at the Essen Summit there are important security 
"oncems on Europe's Southern Flank as well. 
We share Portugal's concern about Mediterranean stability. The bcst 
tcslimony to that fac I is the effol'! that we have ma de over lour deeades 
to advanee the cause of Midle East peace. Over the last year and a half 
wc havc seen Cl10rmous pl"ogress toward a just and lasting peace, notwiths-
wnding the continuing difficulties. 
But we are also eoncerned about stability in the Western Mediterranean, 
and appreciatc the European Union's new levei of attention to this issue. 
We have traditional1y strong ties to Morocco and Tunisia, and numerous 
American companies have sizeable business interests in Algeria's oil and 
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gas industries. A triumph 01 extremism in Algeria would have an impact 
not only on our business interests there but carries the potential to upset 
the stability of other North Alrican countries. 
We believe that the way forward lies in political and economic reform 
in Algeria. We welcome the progress that Algeria has made on the economic 
front, but wc continue to belicve that economic refol'nl must bc accompa· 
nied by political reformo We urge genuinc political dialogue between thc 
AIgerian government and opposition elements, including Islamist leaders 
who rcnounce terrorismo 
Turning to bilateral US-Portuguese eooperation in the seclll'ity spherc, 
let me add a word about Lajes Air Base. As you know, your government 
and mine have been negotiating for severa! years now a ncw Agreement 011 
Cooperation and Defense that will regulate the US presence at Lajes as 
wel! as create a much broader basis of bilateral cooperation extcnding wel! 
beyond lhe realm of security issues. We have reached tenta tive agreement 
on aI! but one issue. We remain optimistic that final agreemcnt will be 
reached in the not-too-distant future. Meanwhile. both countries continue 
to benefi! from our longstanding relationship 01 tmst and cooperation 
at Lajes. 
The nature of oU!' bilateral security relationship has becn changing, 
as Portugal and lhe world have changed. Portugal is now a full-fledged 
111cmber of the European Union. Portugal's economic takc-off has coincided 
wíth the end of the Cold War and with our budget crisis, which has given 
us diminished l'csaurces for security assistance. We are now looking toward 
a new, broader and more mature relationship with Portugal, one Ihal 
cmphasizes cooperation across a broad range af issues rather than a narrow 
foeus on security assistancc a qui pro quo for Qur presence at Lajes. 
The Clinton Administration came into office promising a new focus 
rOl' foreign policy, in keeping with the end of the Cold War and the 
cmergence of new opportunities for a11 expansjon of democracy and world 
eeonomic growth. The three piUars of lhe Clinton Administration's foreign 
policy have remained constant, and will remains so even in the face Df 
the new siluation in Washington, because they reflecI and build on the 
real interests and ideais of the Ameriean people. 
Those three pillars are first, economic seeurity. This piUar has bccn 
the impetus for maior suecesses in foreign trade. including the North 
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American Free Trade Agreement, conc\usion of the GATT, and new impul-
ses· for expanded trade in Asia and Latin America. 
A second pillar is support for democracy. The recent Summit of the 
Americas, bringing together 34 democratically-eIected Ieaders of of the Wes-
tern Hemisphere, highlighted how democracy is sweeping the world. 
The Ihird pilIar is refIected in my commenls loday: The preservalion 
01 peace and securily_ And nOlhing is more pivolaI for the preservation of 
peace around the world than the peace and security of Europe. 
Presidenl Clinlon reaffirmed these principIes just Iast month, in his 
speech lo the Democralic Leadership Conference refIecling on lhe recenl 
CongressionaI eIections_ «America musl remain energetical/y engaged in 
lhe world.> he said, «No/ re/real Irom i/». 
And, he added, «The United S/ates l11ust maintain a strong and capa-
b/e delense ••. And I wouId add, thal is a goaI thal we wiII work lo achieve 
in cooperalion wilh all of our aIlies in Europe. 
The United Slates Governrnenl, and I, as the President's personaI 
representative, are committed to working wilh the government of Portugal, 
bOlh to enhancc our importanl and Iongstanding bilaleraI reIalionship, and 
lo solidify progress loward slability and prosperity for Europe in the posl-
-Cold War world. I look forward lo hearing your views on these imporlanl 
issues. 
Elizabeth Frawley Bagley 
184 
